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I. INTRODUCTION
THE FOLLOWING DISCUSSION will focus on the contro-
versy over the so-called notice requirement of the Warsaw
Convention.' More precisely, the dilemma involves whether the
Convention provides a sanction for failure to provide notice of
the limitations of liability granted air carriers in the Convention,
and, if so, whether that sanction is the loss of those limits of
liability. This question will be explored through a brief section
familiarizing one with the Warsaw Convention system and the
provisions providing the bones of contention, then an in-depth
analysis of the two divergent lines of cases that have addressed
the issue, a consideration of where the issue is today, and, in
merciful conclusion, a view of how the issue ought to be
decided.
II. THE WARSAW CONVENTION SYSTEM
AND ARTICLE 32
The Warsaw Convention was adopted in 1929 as a way to nur-
ture what was then a fledgling industry, international air travel.3
The Convention addressed two monumental issues facing the
industry at the time: the need for uniformity and financial pro-
tection in case of a disaster.4 This first issue concerned the dif-
ferent systems an international carrier would encounter and
attempted to establish uniform rules for the documents of the
trade and to handle such issues as jurisdiction over claims aris-
ing out of the contract for international travel.5 More relevant
to our discussion are the financial aspects of the Warsaw Con-
vention. There was much concern among those interested in
developing the industry that the potentially high damage awards
I Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49
U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1988) [hereinafter Warsaw Convention or Convention].
2 The material for this section was primarily garnered from Andreas F.
Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80
HARv. L. REV. 497 (1967) and ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAw: CASES AND
MATERIALS (2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter LOWENFELD]. The Lowenfeld text is cited
heavily in this article due to its concise statements of the issues and concerns that
led to the present Warsaw Convention-Montreal Agreement system. However, a
reading of the Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn article, with its more in-depth
treatment of the events, is vital to any real understanding of this period.
3 LOWENFELD, supra note 2, at 7-26.




resulting from accidents would stunt the growth of the industry.6
The Warsaw Convention addressed this vital issue by establish-
ing limits of liability for the carriers. The limit was set at $8300
which was generally conceded to be low, even at the time.7 This
limit, however, more than served its purpose of making the in-
dustry attractive for investment. 8
In return for this limitation of liability, the carriers were re-
quired to accept liability without fault and to provide a ticket to
their passengers that contained, among other things, notice of
the limit of liability.9 This quid pro quo was embodied in Article 3
of the Convention, which reads as follows:
(1) For the transportation of passengers the carrier must deliver
a passenger ticket which shall contain the following particulars:
(a) The place and date of issue;
(b) The place of departure and of destination;
(c) The agreed stopping places, provided that the carrier may
reserve the right to alter the stopping places in case of necessity,
and that if he exercises that right, the alteration shall not have
the effect of depriving the transportation of its international
character;
(d) The name and address of the carrier or carriers;
(e) A statement that the transportation is subject to the rules re-
lating to liability established by this convention.
(2) The absence, irregularity, or loss of the passenger ticket shall
not affect the existence or the validity of the contract of transpor-
tation, which shall none the less be subject to the rules of this
convention. Nevertheless, if the carrier accepts a passenger with-
out a passenger ticket having been delivered he shall not be enti-
tled to avail himself of those provisions of this convention which
exclude or limit his liability.'
Eventually, concern for the fledgling international airline in-
dustry faded, and the focus was placed on the remarkably low
limits of liability. As the limitation became increasingly out of
sync with modern standards of compensation, more and more
plaintiffs scoured the wording of the Convention for ways to
avoid the burden of that limitation.1" Article 3 became a vehicle
for such avoidance, first through the concept of constructive
nondelivery, whereby an individual would claim that the ticket
6 Id. at 7-27 to 7-28.
7 Id. at 7-27.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 7-28.
10 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 3, 49 Stat. at 3015.
" See, e.g., Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 352 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965).
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was delivered in a manner that negated the effect of that deliv-
ery. 12 This attempt to avoid liability later developed into the
claim that forms the cornerstone of our discussion: that the
Convention requires some form of adequate notice of the limi-
tations of liability to be provided in order for the car'er to avail
himself of those limitations.1 3
Amid this confusion and dissatisfaction regarding the provi-
sions of the Warsaw Convention, or perhaps due to it, the
United States announced its intention to withdraw from the
Convention. 4 In particular, the government felt that it could
not accept the intolerably low limits of liability (by this time
doubled, but still only $16,600) for its citizens. 5 In response,
there emerged the Montreal Agreement,16 which was a compact
amongst all air carriers doing business in the United States. 7 In
this agreement, in return for the United States remaining in the
Warsaw Convention system, the carriers agreed to raise the limit
on liability to $75,000 and to provide notice of the limit using a
specific agreed-upon statement to be printed in a color contrast-
ing the ticket stock and in no smaller than ten-point size type."8
Thus, it is the combination of these two documents, the War-
saw Convention and the Montreal Agreement, and the in-
terworking of their provisions that provide the material for the
debate: whether the limitation of liability is only accessible when
the carrier provides notice of that limitation. Furthermore, if
so, is the ten-point type requirement in the Montreal Agreement
the proper standard for determining whether the notice has
achieved the necessary level of adequacy?
12 Id. at 496.
13 See, e.g., .Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A., 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir.
1966), aff'd by an equally divided court, 390 U.S. 455 (1968).
14 LOWENFELD, supra note 2, at 7-127.
15 Id. at 7-129 to 7-130.
16 Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol, 31
Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966) [hereinafter Montreal Agreement].
17 LOWENFELD, supra note 2, at 7-138.
18 Id. at 7-144.
394
NOTICE REQUIREMENT
III. THE SCHISM IN THE COURTS OF THE UNITED
STATES REGARDING WHETHER THE WARSAW
CONVENTION SANCTIONS FAILURE TO PROVIDE
NOTICE OF ITS LIABILITY LIMITATIONS WITH THE LOSS
OF THOSE LIMITATIONS
The disparate reading of Article 3(2) of the Warsaw Conven-
tion has led to the emergence of two divergent lines of case law
within the United States. One line relies on a more interpretive
method of treaty construction, going beyond the text and utiliz-
ing the minutes of and writings regarding the conference. In
this manner, adherents to this approach wish to determine the
purpose of the Convention and the goals it attempted to
achieve, and to come to an interpretive decision that presuma-
bly forwards the framers' intent. This method has overwhelm-
ingly resulted in a finding that the intended sanction for failure
to provide adequate notice to the international passenger of the
carrier's limited liability, as provided for in the Convention, is
the loss of that limited liability.
The opposing line of cases is far more conservative in its ap-
proach to treaty construction. These cases advocate and apply a
strict textual analysis, focusing only on the words contained in
the Convention. The rationale for such an approach is that it is
not a court's function to legislate or remake international trea-
ties. The assumption is that all parties agreed on the text before
them and that the text is therefore the best representation of
their intent. In the absence of ambiguity, therefore, the text
should control. In the interpretation of Article 3(2), courts ad-
hering to this method have found no ambiguities or other rea-
sons to deviate from the text. Consequently, the courts have
held that there is nothing in the Warsaw Convention that im-
poses a loss of limited liability sanction for failure to provide
notice of such to the carrier's passengers.
A. DISCUSSION OF THE LINE OF CASES REQUIRING NOTICE IN
ORDER TO RETAIN THE LIMITATION
In one of the initial encounters with the so-called notice prob-
lem, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit set the stage
for future analysis of the problem by focusing on the ticket deliv-
ery requirement of Article.3(2) of the Warsaw Convention. The
Convention subparagraph reads:
The absence, irregularity, or loss of the passenger ticket shall not
affect the existence or the validity of the contract of transporta-
1995-1996] 395
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tion, which shall none the less be subject to the rules of this con-
vention. Nevertheless, if the carrier accepts a passenger without
a passenger ticket having been delivered he shall not be entitled
to avail himself of those provisions of this convention which ex-
clude or limit his liability. 19
The issue arose in Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc.,"° a case
dealing with restitution for a fatal airline crash near Tachikawa
Air Force Base, Tokyo, Japan. One of the plaintiffs' main con-
tentions was that the delivery requirement of Article 3(2) had
not been satisfied, and, therefore, the carrier was not entitled to
the limitations of liability provided for by the Convention.2
The plaintiff based this contention on the fact that the ticket for
the flight was not delivered to Lieutenant Mertens until both he
and the material he was accompanying were on the plane, which
was ready to take off. The court found that "[u]nder [such]
circumstances it could not be said that Lieutenant Mertens had
a reasonable opportunity to take any measures to protect him-
self against the limitation of liability."2 2
The court reasoned that there would be little purpose in re-
quiring the delivery of a ticket, and requiring that ticket to con-
tain notice of the carrier's limited liability, without also
requiring that the ticket be delivered under circumstances af-
fording the passenger reasonable opportunity to take protective
measures. 23 Thus, the delivery of a ticket past the time when the
passenger could reasonably react and respond to the notice of
limited liability contained therein equaled failure to deliver. 4
Therefore, the delivery requirement of Article 3 (2) was not satis-
fied in these circumstances, and the carrier was not entitled to
the limitation of liability contained in the Convention. 25 Inter-
estingly, the court also noted that "the statement concerning the
limitation of liability was printed in such a manner as to virtually
be both unnoticeable and unreadable."26 While this was not the
focus of the court's decision, the court allowed that it was a fac-
tor in its conclusion of nondelivery.2 7
19 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(2), 49 Stat. at 3015.
20 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965).
21 Id. at 856.








The issue of the sufficiency of ticket delivery was revisited in
Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc.28 In Warren, the passengers were
given boarding tickets at the foot of the boarding ramp of the
plane and were required to board immediately. As, in Mertens,
which was heavily cited, the court in Warren found that delivery
under such circumstances was far too late for the passengers to
have a reasonable opportunity to read the information con-
tained in the ticket, much less have the opportunity to take pro-
tective measures.29 The court approached the analysis of the
text of the Convention by reading its provisions as a single inte-
grated whole, as opposed to a collection of separate, self-suffi-
cient concepts. This method led the court to believe that the
ticket delivery requirement and the limitation of liability provi-
sion worked together.30 Thus, delivery under circumstances
that prevented effective notice would not fulfill the require-
ments of Article 3(2), and the limitation of liability would not be
available to the carrier. 1 The court found that the belated de-
livery of the ticket deprived the passengers of a right that the
Convention intended to provide them as a quid pro quo for the
carrier's right to limit its liability.3 2 In this case, the carrier did
not live up to its end of the. bargain, and was thus prevented
from reaping the benefits of limited liability.'
Mertens and Warren provided a foundation for analyzing Arti-
cle 3(2) problems by positing that the requirements of printed
notice of the carrier's limited liability under the Convention and
the delivery of a ticket were intended to work in concert. The
conceptual extension of this was that where a ticket was received
in circumstances that could not reasonably be considered as
providing the passenger with adequate notice, the delivery was
determined to be insufficient for the purposes of Article 3(2).
Since a failure to deliver a ticket resulted in the loss of the limi-
tation of liability, the net effect of viewing the provisions of the
Convention in this way was that the actual requirement for re-
ceiving the limitation of liability was the delivery of a ticket in
such a manner as to provide adequate notice of those limita-
tions. This was a significant movement beyond merely requiring
the delivery of the ticket, with the circumstances of such delivery
being irrelevant.
28 352 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965).
29 Id. at 497-98.
30 Id. at 497.
31 Id. at 498.
32 Id.
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The next major step in the development of the law in this
area was taken in Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A."3 The
court seized upon one of the factors considered in Mertens and
from it developed a new level of analysis for Article 3(2)
problems. Mertens had cited the fact that the required statement
of notice in the ticket "was printed in such a manner as to virtu-
ally be both unnoticeable and unreadable '3 4 as one of its rea-
sons for finding that there had been no delivery of the ticket,
and thus, no limitation of liability. The court in Lisi advanced
this concept to the next level by decoupling the requirement of
adequate notice from the requirement of delivery of a ticket..
This enabled a passenger who had unquestionably received
proper delivery of the ticket to still avoid the Convention's limi-
tation of the carrier's liability by showing that the notice con-
tained in that ticket was somehow deficient.
In Lisi, the court found that the tradeoff established in the
Warsaw Convention was that the carrier was to be granted lim-
ited liability in return for the carrier's provision to the passenger
of a ticket complete with notice of such limitations.35 The court
felt that Article 3 could not be considered in isolation; rather,
the proper method of construction would be to "[view it] in
light of the other Articles and the overall purposes of the Con-
vention."3 6 The result of such analysis was that if the Article was
to be given meaning, the inquiry must be "whether the ticket
[was] delivered to the passenger in such a manner as to afford
him a reasonable opportunity to take measures to protect him-
self against the limitation of liability." 7 Such framing of the is-
sue clearly requires some level of adequacy of the notice in
order for the notice to be acceptable (if there was inadequate
notice, it would be impossible for an individual to be aware of
his or her need to take self-protective measures, thus violating
the required standard for acceptable delivery). With the inquiry
to be used thus developed, the court was left to the task of deter-
mining whether the trial judge had correctly applied the stan-
dard to the facts of the case. The court agreed with the lower
court's finding that the required notice was "camouflaged in
33 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd by an equ'ally divided court, 390 U.S. 455
(1968).
3 Mertens, 341 F.2d at 857.
35 Lisi, 370 F.2d at 512-13.
36 Id. at 512.
37 Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Mertens, 341 F.2d at 856)).
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Lilliputian print in a thicket of 'Conditions of Contract.' "938
The trial judge further found that the notice was virtually invisi-
ble due to the fact that it was "ineffectively positioned, diminu-
tively sized, and unemphasized by boldfaced type, contrasting
color or anything else."3 9 In sum, the notice was "so artfully
[hidden] that [its] presence [was] concealed." 40 The appeals
court agreed with the findings of the lower court and held that
the provided notice did not meet the required standards and, as
a consequence, the carrier was not entitled to the benefit of the
limitation of liability.41
The effect of the holding in Lisi is significant because it devel-
oped a new analysis for cases that involved Article 3(2)-an
analysis that focused entirely on the sufficiency of the notice
printed on the ticket. This is also a major step in the construc-
tion of the Warsaw Convention. While previous courts had used
the "ambiguity" (in quotes because there is much debate over
whether the Convention is in fact ambiguous at all) of the Con-
vention to take a more interpretive reading of the Convention,
resulting in the coupling of the notice and delivery require-
ments, courts also had stayed within the basic confines of the
quid pro quo as it was written and had only removed the limits of
liability for the failure to deliver a ticket. Although that concept
had degenerated to the point of being a type of constructive
failure to deliver, the linkage of the two concepts had been
maintained as it had been in the Convention. In Lisi this was no
longer the case. By decoupling the notice concept from the de-
livery requirement, the court also removed the direct link be-
tween the fledgling concept of an acceptable standard of notice
being required and the penalty for failure to do so being the
loss of the carrier's limit of liability. Thus, we are left with an
almost common-sense approach to treaty construction, boiling
down to the idea that if the writers of the Convention did not
mean to require some type of adequate notice, why require no-
tice at all, and if the requirement for delivery of a ticket (failure
to do so resulting in the loss of limited liability) was not to en-*
38 Id. at 514 (quoting Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A., 253 F. Supp.
237, 243 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd, 390 U.S. 455
(1968)).
39 Id. (quoting Lisi, 253 F. Supp. at 243).
40 Id. (quoting Lisi, 253 F. Supp. at 243).
41 Id. At the Supreme Court level, the Lisi decision was affirmed by an equally
divided (4-4) Court, asJustice Marshall took no part in its consideration, having
had previous involvement with the case. Lisi, 390 U.S. 455 (1968).
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sure that the traveller received the notice, than what was it for?
Thus, if the purpose behind requiring delivery was to provide
notice and notice must be adequate to be effective, then it
makes sense to have the failure to provide adequate notice re-
sult in the loss of the limitation of liability.
The Lisi mode of analysis was utilized by the court in Egan v.
Kollsman Instrument Corp.4 2 In Egan, the ticket in question con-
tained the required notice in "exceedingly small, almost unread-
able (4 1/2-point) print."43 The court found that even though
there was literal compliance with the prescription of Article 3,
the exceedingly small and fine print of the notice, when viewed
in light of the overall purposes of the Convention, did not satisfy
the requirement." The court reasoned that "a statement which
cannot reasonably be deciphered fails of its purpose and func-
tion of affording notice and may not be accepted as the sort of
statement contemplated or required by the Convention."4 5
Thus, the court held that the notice provided by the carrier was
inadequate and therefore the carrier forfeited the Convention's
limits of liability.46 By this point in time, the idea that adequate
notice was required under the Warsaw Convention was so preva-
lent that the Egan court concluded its opinion by stating: "These
[cited] decisions and regulations [14 C.F.R. § 221.175] are sug-
gestive of a national policy requiring that air carriers give pas-
sengers clear and conspicuous notice before they will be
permitted to limit their liability for injuries caused by their
negligence. "47
In Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft v. Civil Aeronautics
Board,48 the question of satisfactory notice was again raised. In
this instance, however, it was in the context of the German air-
line's challenge of a Civil Aeronautics Board (C.A.B.) regulation
requiring the inclusion of a specifically worded notice, printed
in ten-point type, on the tickets of all international flights de-
parting from or entering into the United States. The court
noted that the recent trend of appellate court decisions had
been to accord substance to the protections of Article 3 of the
42 234 N.E.2d 199 (N.Y. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1039 (1968).
43 Id. at 200.
44 Id. at 203.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 204.
47 Id.
48- 479 F.2d 912 (D.C. Cir., 1973).
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Warsaw Convention.49 In this fashion, the courts were carrying
out the intention of the Convention by ensuring that the airlines
were adhering to their part of the quid pro quo in order to re-
ceive the limit of liability. The court found that the rationale
underlying the cases in this area was the requirement that pas-
sengers be afforded ample opportunity to comprehend the limi-
tations of liability to which they are subjected, and that they be
given a chance to purchase alternative, private insurance. 50 The
court felt that the passenger should not be forced to traverse an
obstacle course created by the carriers in order to successfully
discover their rights and the extent of the carrier's limitations of
liability. 51 Thus, the sum of the law was that the passenger was
to receive full and effective notice of any limitations of liability
so that alternative protection may be obtained. The result of
noncompliance with the adequate notice requirement was the
loss of the limitation on liability provided by the Convention.
The court held that the regulation was appropriate, and could
even be interpreted as beneficial to the carriers.52 The court
reasoned that, by forcing the carriers to provide a ten-point type
notice (undeniably adequate in size), the carriers would be able
to retain the benefit of the limitation of liability.
53
The requirement of ten-point type for the notice of limited
liability was also a major issue in In re Air Crash Disaster at War-
saw, Poland, on March 14, 198. 5" But rather than focusing on
the C.A.B. regulation, this issue arose out of a crash in which the
passengers were issued tickets containing the notice in only 8 1/
2-point type. The main area of contention in the case was
whether failure to comply with the ten-point type notice require-
ment in the Montreal Agreement resulted in a loss of the limita-
tion of liability, or whether the Agreement could be read as
requiring "adequate notice" with the ten-point type stipulation
merely intended to be a guideline. The main thrust of the argu-
ment of defendant, Polskie Linie Lotnicze (LOT Polish Air-
lines), was that under the Warsaw Convention and previous
United States case law, all that was required to avail oneself of
the limitation of liability was to provide the passenger adequate
notice of such limitation. With that being the standard, LOT
49 Id. at 917.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 917-18.
53 Id.
54 705 F.2d 85 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 845 (1983).
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contended, the inclusion of notice in 8 1/2-point type provided
sufficient notice, and, thus, LOT should be entitled to the limi-
tation. The court disagreed. The court found that the Montreal
Agreement qualified as a "special contract" under article 22(1)
of the Warsaw Convention and, as such, it effectively modified
the Convention. 55 Thus, the requirement for legally sufficient
notice was no longer merely "adequate notice" but rather a no-
tice printed in ten-point type. The court found that the specifi-
cation of type size was just as important as the requirement ,of
delivery for Article 3(2) purposes, and LOT's failure to comply
with this requirement prevented LOT from taking advantage of
the limitation of liability that it would otherwise enjoy.56
The holding in In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw is quite signifi-
cant because of the weight it, accords to the Montreal Agree-
ment. It raises at least portions of the Agreement to a status
virtually equivalent to that of a treaty and thereby the control-
ling law of the land. Additionally, the approach taken to the
Agreement has its provisions effectively amending those of the
Warsaw Convention as well as blending in with the requirements
and obligations of the Convention. Thus, through this interpre-
tation, the court was able to consider the higher liability limit in
the Montreal Agreement as amending the Warsaw Convention,
with the ten-point type provision setting the standard for what
would be considered adequate notice under the new Warsaw
Convention-Montreal Agreement regime, and to keep the loss
of the limitation of liability as the sanction for the violation of
the new regime's notice requirement.
The issue was again revisited in In re Air Crash Disaster Near New
Orleans, Louisiana on July 9, 1982.-7 The defendant, Pan Ameri-
can Air Lines, raised virtually the same arguments as LOT did in
the Warsaw crash case. In this instance, the notice provided by
Pan Am was in nine-point type. As LOT had Contended, Pan
Am likewise claimed that its type provided sufficient notice and
that the difference between ten-point and nine-point type was of
no consequence. The court agreed with the Second Circuit's
opinion in Warsaw and held that the requirement is for ten-
point type, not an amorphous "adequate notice" standard. 8 Be-
ing that the notice in question was printed in nine-point type, it
55 Id. at 88.
56 Id. at 90.
57 789 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1986), vacated, 490 U.S. 1032 (1989).
58 Id. at 1098.
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was deemed insufficient, and the carrier was precluded from in-
voking the limit of liability.59
B. ' THE ARGUMENT FOR REQUIRING NOTICE
Even though there have been significant developments and
alterations of the rationales that courts have used to enforce
some form of an adequate notice requirement on the air carri-
ers, a common thread runs through all of the arguments. The
fundamental principle has been the commitment to a more ex-
pansive method of treaty interpretation. The courts have
looked beyond the plain language of both the Warsaw Conven-
tion and the Montreal Agreement and have attempted to divine
the writers' intent and the true purpose of the treaty and the
Agreement. Upon undertaking such an endeavor, the -courts
have found that, in one fashion or another, there is a require-
ment of notice. Furthermore, they have determined that the
failure to provide such notice results in the loss of the limitation
of liability established in the Convention.
The empirical argument begins with an analysis of Article
3(2) of the Warsaw Convention. A plain reading indicates that a
carrier is required to provide the passenger with a ticket and
that failure to do so will prevent the carrier from benefiting-
from the limitation of liability provisions in the Warsaw Conven-
tion. Additionally, that ticket is required to contain a notice to
the passenger of the liability provisions of the Convention. The
nascent form of the argument found that the delivery of the
ticket in circumstances that precluded the passenger from act-
ing on the notice was equivalent to a failure to deliver and thus
removed the limitations of liability. As the argument
progressed, it moved away from the constructive nondelivery
concept and delved more into an adequate notice standard.
This was not textually supported, but justification was found
through attempts to determine the intent of the drafters and
through the drifting history.
The present-day argument has two interconnected elements.
First, adherents assert that the drafters intended the sanction of
loss of the limit of liability for failure to include notice. of that
limit in the ticket. Second, the required notice must achieve at
least some minimal standard of adequacy. Thus, a failure to
provide adequate notice is equivalent to a failure to provide any
59 Id.
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notice at all and will result in the loss of the limitation of liability
for the carrier.
C. THE LIMITATION OF LIABILITY AS NOT DEPENDENT ON ANY
TYPE OF NOTICE
The opposing line of cases depends on a much simpler mode
of analysis and argument to arrive at a contrary conclusion. The
approach is a straightforward literal interpretation of the text of
the Warsaw Convention. Believing that the text is the best rep-
resentation of the parties' intent, adherents of this method find
no reason to inquire beyond the Convention's provisions. They
do not get involved in the assessment of intent or the quandary
of how best to implement that intent while still complying with
the text.
While courts in the United States found an adequate notice
requirement within the Warsaw Convention on an ever increas-
ing basis, courts in the rest of the world adhered to a more lit-
eral interpretation of the text and found that there was no such
requirement in the Warsaw Convention. A prime example of
this is the oft-cited Ludecke v. Canadian Pacific Airlines Ltd.,6" a
1979 Canadian Supreme Court case. The court in Ludecke ad-
dressed the international deviation. To begin, the Ludecke court
briefly summarized the American position and asserted that the
primary motivation behind such decisions was the dissatisfaction
of the American courts with the extremely low limits of liability
established in the Warsaw Convention. 61 The court then sum-
marized the opposing position by stating that other jurisdictions
assert that "Article 3 fails to provide any sanction for its breach
except in a case where a passenger has been accepted with no
ticket. Therefore [,] a ticket bearing an illegible statement or no
statement at all would not result in a loss of limitation to the
carrier."62 In the case presented, the court was faced with a situ-
ation in which a ticket had been delivered but the notice con-
tained therein was printed in 4 1/2-point type. Plaintiff's
contention, obviously, was that this provided no notice whatso-
ever, and thus the carrier should not be able to assert its limita-
tion of liability. The court found that "the words of [Article]
3(2) are plain and can admit of no misunderstanding. The ab-
sence, irregularity or loss of a passenger ticket will not affect the
60 98 D.L.R.3d 52 (Can. 1979).




existence or the validity of the contract of carriage. "63 Thus, the
benefit of the limitation will only be lost if no ticket is delivered.
The Canadian judge felt that American courts ignored the plain
meaning of the Convention and "fail[ed] to give effect to a pre-
cise statement of the law."64 In conclusion, the court, although
believing the limitation tobe harsh and unreasonable, held that
the only requirement for preserving the right to the limitation
was the delivery of a ticket, and in the case presented, that re-
quirement was satisfied.65
Back on the American side of the border, In re Korean Air Lines
Disaster of September 1, 198366 confronted the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia with the question of
whether failure to comply with the ten-point type limit for no-
tice mandated by the Montreal Agreement would strip the car-
rier of its limitation of liability. Korean Air Lines arose from the
destruction of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 by the Soviet Union
as the airplane flew over the Sea of Japan. The passengers on
that flight had received tickets with the notice printed in only
eight-point type. The claimants, relying on Warsaw and New Or-
leans, attempted to have this deficiency prevent Korean Air
Lines from invoking the limit of liability.
The court began with an analysis of the Montreal Agreement.
The court found that, while the Agreement prescribed that the
notice be printed in ten-point type and in ink contrasting to the
ticket stock, it made no mention of sanctions for failure to com-
ply.6 7 Additionally, the court noted that the Montreal Agree-,
ment was effectuated with the intention of preventing the
United States from denouncing the Warsaw Convention; there-
fore, the court viewed the Agreement as an attempt to preserve
the limit of liability (although the limit was raised in the Mon-
treal Agreement, the court apparently reasoned that if the
United States had pulled out of the Warsaw Convention and its
limitations on liability, international airline disasters litigated in
the United States would be decided under the American tort
system which has no limits of liability).68
The court then considered the present judicial requirement
of adequate notice. It found that courts now consistently con-
63 Id. at 57.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 57-58.
66 664 F. Supp. 1463 (D.D.C. 1985).
67 Id. at 1466.
6 Id.
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strue Article 3(2) of the Convention, which sanctions nondeliv-
ery of a ticket, to apply to physically delivered tickets that fail io
contain adequate notice of the Warsaw/Montreal limitation.69
In this way, courts have enabled passengers to avoid the harsh
effects of the treaty system. The court felt that the increasing
importance placed on the passenger's need to know of the limi-
tation was not really part of the Convention, but, rather, an
American legal concept that had been judicially grafted onto
the Convention system in order to give "substance" to the, ticket
delivery requirement. 70 To further illustrate this point, the
court cited the dissent in Lisi, echoed in Ludecke, that "[t]he ma-
jority [in Lisi] do not approve of the terms of the treaty [due to
its limitation on liability] and, therefore, by judicial fiat they re-
write it."7
1
The court then discussed Article 3, pointing out that while
there is a required "statement that the transportation is subject
to the rules relating to liability established by this convention,"72
the Convention is silent with regard to the specifics of the con-
tents of the notice and the adequacy of that notice.73 Addition-
ally, defects in the ticket do not remove it from the Convention
system. Therefore, inadequate notice could be seen as a defect
or irregularity in the ticket that "shall not affect the existence or
the validity of the contract of transportation" which is still gov-
erned by the Convention. 74 Thus, seeing inadequacy of notice
as a defect rather than a failure to meet a requirement has the
effect of preserving the limitation for the carrier. The court
took issue with the decision in Lisi that, without adequate no-
tice, there could be no delivery of the ticket.75 The Korean Air
Lines court felt that such an interpretation ignored the Conven-
tion's provision that inadequacies do not affect the applicability
of the Convention.76 Additionally, the Korean Air Lines court
perceived Article 3(2) to be directed to the entire ticket, as evi-
dence that a contract has been formed, as opposed to the ticket
69 Id. at 1472.
70 Id.
71 Id. (quoting Lisi, 370 F.2d at 515 (Moore, J., dissenting)).
72 Id. (quoting Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(1) (e), 49 Stat. at 3015).
73 Id. (quoting Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(2), 49 Stat. at 3015).
74 Id. at 1472-73 (quoting Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(2), 49 Stat.
at 3015).
75 Id. at 1473-74.
76 Id. at 1474.
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functioning merely as a vehicle for the notice of the limitation
of liability. 77
The Korean Air Lines court's next departure from Lisi and pre-
vious case law was with regard to the determination of the exact
quid pro quo embodied by the Convention system. The court in
Lisi had defined the quid pro quo as the carrier's presentation to
the passenger of a ticket which gave the passenger notice of the
limitation of liability in return for that limit.7 8 The Korean Air
Lines court strongly disagreed. Rather, it asserted, the true ex-
change was the limitation of liability for the carrier in return for
the carrier's acceptance of a presumption of liability.79 The
court concluded that there was no evidence that the treaty draft-
ers and signatories intended "adequate notice" to affect the op-
eration of the treaty limitation.80
The court then turned its attention to the ten-point type re-
quirement found in the Montreal Agreement. The court again
disagreed with previous case law, this time disputing the Warsaw
court's assessment of the provision. According to the Korean Air
Lines court, construing the Montreal Agreement as part of the
Warsaw Convention served the purposes of the Warsaw court by
enabling the Warsaw court to circumvent the Convention's lim-
its of liability.8 ' However, such an interpretation "does not ac-
cord the treaty provision the meaning evident from the
negotiation and debate which led to its promulgation."8" The
Korean Air Lines court found that "[n]othing in the Montreal
Agreement require [d] that an air carrier provide the statement
of liability limitation in 10-point type or lose the benefit of that
limitation."83 The effect of the Montreal Agreement was to sup-
plement the quid pro quo of the Warsaw Convention. It accom-
plished this by raising the amount of the limitation and waiving
the carrier's defenses under Article 20, thereby providing abso-
lute liability for injury to passengers.84 It also further supple-
mented Article 3 by requiring that the notice statement comply
77 Id.
78 Lisi, 370 F.2d at 513.
79 Korean Air Lines, 664 F. Supp. at 1474.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 1475.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 1475-76.
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with certain specifics when the carrier has stops in the United
States, but it did not link articles 20 and 22 with Article 3.85
Beyond that alleged addition to the Montreal Agreement by
the Warsaw court, the Korean Air Lines court also disagreed with
the Warsaw court's reading of the Montreal Agreement as
amending the Warsaw Convention, especially with regard to the
notice provision. 6 The Korean Air Lines court felt that, while the
Montreal Agreement must be read in connection with the War-
saw Convention, it cannot be read wholesale into the Warsaw
Convention.87 Thus, the resulting Warsaw/Montreal system
does not include the loss of limited liability for failure to provide
notice in ten-point type."8 The court felt that to hold otherwise
would be an exercise in judicial treatymaking, which is not only
improper, but completely unwarranted in this case.89 The Ko-
rean Air Lines court cited the United States government's brief in
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., which asserted
that "[t]he United States remains committed to the Convention
as the basic instrument governing questions of liability in the
international aviation industry."90
The Korean Air Lines court concluded that, since the Montreal
Agreement is not a negotiated amendment to the Warsaw Con-
vention, it cannot be construed as establishing ten-point type
notice as a precondition for accessing the Convention's grant of
limited liability.91 Additionally, the court cited the worldwide
approval of and adherence to the limits established in the Con-
vention system.92 The court felt that in light of such universal
acceptance, it would be particularly inappropriate for the court
to interpret the treaty provisions in such a way as to relieve the
United States of its treaty obligations.93 The court further noted
that the Montreal Agreement does not express any intent to
have the failure to include proper notice result in a loss of lim-
ited liability.9 4 Since making an intolerable treaty provision tol-
erable is not within the province of the courts, the Korean Air





90 Id. (quoting Amicus Curiae Brief of the United States at 2, Franklin Mint
Corp., 466 U.S. 243 (1984) (No. 82-1186)).






Lines court refused to interpret the Warsaw system as requiring
ten-point type notice in order to retain the limitation of liabil-
ity.95 Thus, claimants' request for such a finding was denied.96
The discussion of the line of cases supporting loss of limited
liability for failure to provide adequate notice was concluded
with a distillation of the several arguments to reflect the devel-
opments the courts made over time. The opposing view does
not lend itself to such analysis, as it would inevitably be a mere
recapitulation of Korean Air Lines, which has just been discussed
in detail (one might say excruciating detail). The case crystal-
lizes the main elements of the argument, which consist, first and
foremost, of a much more literal interpretation of the relevant
texts than that used in the opposing arguments, and of a but-
tressing policy argument regarding the court's role in treaty
construction and interpretation.
IV. NOTICE'S WATERLOO? THE SUPREME COURT
ADDRESSES THE QUESTION IN CHAN V. KOREAN
AIR LINES, LTD. AND CARNIVAL CRUISE
LINES, INC. V SHUTE
A. CHAN v. KoREAN AIR LiEs, LWz.-JuSTICE SCALIA'S
MAJORrY OPINION
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia's
holding in Korean Air Lines was affirmed on appeal and subse-
quently reached the Supreme Court as Chan v. Korean Air Lines,
Ltd.97
In writing the majority opinion for the Court, Justice Scalia
phrased the question presented for appeal as "whether interna-
tional air carriers lose the benefit of the limitation on damages
for passenger injury or death provided by ... the Warsaw Con-
vention if they fail to provide notice of that limitation in the 10-
point type size required by a private accord among carriers, the
Montreal Agreement.""
The argument presented by the petitioners was, in essence, a
condensed version of the concepts proffered by the courts as-
serting that the limit of liability and the notice requirement are
linked. The petitioners contended that Article 3 of the Warsaw
Convention removed the protection of limited liability if the car-
95 Id.
9 Id. at 1477-78.
97 490 U.S. 122 (1989).
98 Id. at 123.
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rier failed to provide adequate notice of the Convention's limit
in the carrier's passenger tickets. Next, the petitioners asserted
that the Montreal Agreement worked in concert with the War-
saw Convention by providing the standard for determining
whether the notice is adequate, the ten-point type requirement.
The majority nipped this argument in the bud by refusing to
accept the petitioners' first proposition that notice and the limi-
tation on liability are inextricably linked in the Warsaw
Convention.9 9
Employing a more literal form of interpretation of the text,
the majority found that, while Article 3(1) (e) requires a ticket to
contain "[a] statement that the transportation is subject to the
rules relating to liability established by this convention," 100 there
is nothing in Article 3 or in the rest of the Convention that im-
poses a sanction for a failure to comply with any form of ade-
quacy regarding that statement. 0 1 In fact, Article 3's only
sanction is the loss of the limits of liability for failure to deliver a
ticket to the passenger. 10 2 The majority then noted the many
different interpretations of lower courts but concluded that
such a reading was errant. 03 The Chan Court found expansion
of the meaning of Article 3(2)'s requirement of delivery of a
ticket to delivery of a ticket in compliance with the requirements
of the Convention to be implausible.10 4 Further, such a reading
seemingly directly contradicts Article 3(2)'s provision that the
irregularity of the ticket shall not remove the contract for trans-
portation from the terms of the Convention. 0 5 Thus, it was felt
to be clear that an irregularity (ostensibly the inadequate no-
tice) did not prevent a document from being a ticket and did
not eliminate the contractual damages limitation provided for
by the Convention.'0 6 The language stipulating the loss of liabil-
ity for failure to deliver a ticket was interpreted, rather literally,
as failure to deliver any document whatsoever. 0 7 The only ex-
ception could be the "delivery of a document whose shortcom-
ings [were] so extensive that it [could not] reasonably be
99 Id. at 126.











described as a 'ticket' (for example, a mistakenly delivered
blank form, with no data filled in)."108 When measured against
such a standard, the petitioners' claim that a notice printed in
eight-point type was defective because the Montreal Agreement
required ten-point type was seen as highly unpersuasive. In fact,
the majority used that alleged deficiency as an example of what
could not possibly prevent a document from being considered a
ticket.109
The majority similarly rejected the contention that, for the
purposes of Article 3(2), the delivery of a defective ticket was
equivalent to the delivery of no ticket at all. Under the major-
ity's analysis, there was no textual basis for differentiating the
notice requirement from any of the other requirements of the
section, such as the requirement that a ticket must contain the
address of the carrier. 110 Thus, if failure to give adequate notice
resulted in the loss of limited liability for the carrier, so should
failure to include the carrier's address, a result that the majority
deemed absurd."'
The majority buttressed its textual interpretation of Article 3
by comparing Article 3 to other sections of the Warsaw Conven-
tion. The Court noted that in both the section referring to bag-
gage checks and the one controlling air waybills, the
Convention, as in the section regarding passengers, had specifi-
cally stated that if the relevant document was not delivered, then
the carrier was not entitled to the limitations of liability. How-
ever, the sections diverge in their treatment of a carrier's failure
to include certain particulars in the documents, including but
not limited to the notice of liability limitation. Both Section II
(Baggage) and Section III (Air Waybill) specifically impose the
sanction of loss of liability limitation for such deficiency in their
documents, whereas Section I (Passengers) does not specifically
so state.1 2 Thus, the argument goes, the drafters displayed their
cognizance of the concept and their ability to implement it
through its inclusion in Sections II and III; hence, its omission
from Section I must have been intentional.1 3 Therefore, it
108 Id. at 129.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 130.
III Id.
112 Id. at 131.
1s Id. at 133.
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would be improper to impose the sanction where the drafters
clearly did not intend it to apply.1 1 4
The majority concluded by stating that the text of the Warsaw
Convention did not admit analysis of drafting history or other
methods that are used to elucidate an ambiguous text, because
the text was entirely clear on its face. a"' Further, the Warsaw
Convention clearly did not eliminate the limitation on damages
as a sanction for failure to provide adequate notice of that
provision.1 16
B. THE CONCURRENCE IN CHA--JUSTICE BRENNAN'S
RESPONSE
The concurrence, written by Justice Brennan and supported
by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, reached the same
ultimate result in the case (i.e., that the limitation of liability
applied), but adopted a remarkably different mode of analysis,
leading to some significantly different conclusions.
The concurrence took issue with the majority's "misplaced lit-
eralism and disregard of context" with regard to the interpreta-
tion of the Warsaw Convention.1 7 While conceding that the
majority's reading of the treaty was plausible, the concurrence
felt that it was an error to believe that the majority's view was the
only possible reading.1 " To do so "disregard[s] the wealth of
evidence to be found in the Convention's drafting history on
the intent of the governments that drafted the document."" 9
The concurrence then embarked on a more liberal analysis of
the text, taking into account the "extrinsic evidence of the
treatymakers' intent." 2 °
The concurrence initially took issue with the majority's inter-
pretation of Article 3(2), which, in part, provides that "[t] he ab-
sence, irregularity, or loss of the passenger ticket shall not affect
the existence or the validity of the contract for transportation,
which shall none the less be subject to the rules of this conven-
tion." 21 The majority interpreted this provision as stipulating
114 Id.
115 Id. at 134.
116 Id. at 135.
117 Id. at 138 n.5 (Brennan, J., concurring).
118 Id. at 136.
119 Id.
120 Id.




that a failure to comply with any of Article 3's requirements was
a mere irregularity and the carrier was still entitled to the bene-
fits of the Convention. 122 The concurrence, however, asserted
that the Article provided that a valid contract for passage exists
despite any irregularities in the ticket.123 Furthermore, "that
contract is still governed by all of the provisions of the Conven-
tion," including the requirement of notice of the limits of liabil-
ity.124 Such an interpretation alters the effect of Article 3(2)
from protecting the carrier (in the majority's view, the carrier is
entitled to the limitation of liability as long as the carrier deliv-
ers a ticket, no matter how deficient that ticket is) to protecting
the passenger (by binding the carrier to the provisions of the
Convention and not allowing a deficient ticket to be an escape
hatch for the carrier to avoid its obligations). 125 Thus, the con-
currence viewed Article 3(2). as preventing carriers from benefit-
ting from their own nonconformance, and concluded that the
loss of the limitation of liability was included in the Convention
to deter such nonconformance.
The concurrence then offered an abridged version of the
drafting history of the Convention, highlighting a few salient
points. One such point was the concurrence's determination
that "it [was] abundantly clear throughout the entire drafting
process the delegates intended to apply the same regime of
sanctions for failure to comply with the provisions concerning
passenger tickets, baggage checks, and air waybills.' 26 In sup-
port of this conclusion, the concurrence cited the report of
Monsieur de Vos, prepared on behalf of the Comit6 Interna-
tional Technique d'Experts Juridiques A~rins (CITEJA) to ac-
company its final draft of the Convention. In part, the report
stated that "the sanction provided ... for carriage of passengers
without a ticket or with a ticket not conforming to the Convention is
122 Id. at 128.
123 Id. at 137 (Brennan, J., concurring).
124 Id. (emphasis in original).
125 For example, a carrier would be prohibited from providing a deficient
ticket and, in the event of a suit, asserting that such a ticket removed the contract
for passage from under the purview of the Convention system. Thus, a plaintiff
would not be entitled to any of the Convention systems benefits, including the
presumption of carrier liability.
126 Id. at 139 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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identical to that provided . .. for carriage of baggage and
goods."' 27
The concurrence also stated that the drafting history was ab-
solutely clear that the carrier was to lose the limit of liability if its
,passenger ticket did not include the listed particulars.' 21 While
it is open to debate whether or not the notice clause was one of
those particulars, and the concurrence was inclined to consider
it as such, the concurrence assumed it arguendo and began to
address petitioners' specific claims: primarily that the notice re-
quirement must meet a standard of adequacy-and whether or
not Korean Air Lines' notice in this case met that standard.' 29
The concurrence reprised the consensus of American courts
that adequate notice is required by the Warsaw Convention.
The concurrence further conceded that receiving notice under
conditions that precluded the passenger from self-protection
was inadequate and agreed that "[i]f notice is indeed required,
it must surely meet some minimal standard of 'adequacy.' "130
The question thus turns to what standard of adequacy should
be accepted. The concurrence focused on the eight-point type
notice provided by Korean Air Lines. It distinguished that type
'size from four-point type and found that the size and the fact
that the notice took the form prescribed by the Montreal Agree-
ment and occupied a separate page in the ticket book precluded
it from being considered "camouflaged" or otherwise hidden. '
Responding to the petitioners' assertion that the Montreal
Agreement controlled on the issue and provided the standard
for adequate notice, ten-point type, the concurrence refuted
both contentions. Regarding the Montreal Agreement, the con-
currence classified it as a "private agreement among airline com-
panies, which cannot and does not purport to amend the
Warsaw Convention.' 32 Additionally, the concurrence stated
that the Montreal Agreement did not "purport to sanction fail-
ure to provide notice according to the Agreement's specifica-
tions with loss of the Warsaw Convention's limits on liability."1 33
127 Id. at 140-41 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis in original) (citing SEC-
OND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AERONAUTICAL LAw 247 (R. Horner
& D. Legrez trans., 1975)).
128 Id. at 142.
129 Id. at 148-49.
130 Id. at 150.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 150-51.
414
NOTICE REQUIREMENT
Furthermore, the concurrence asserted that the eight-point type
notice provided by Korean Air Lines was "surely 'adequate'
under any conventional interpretation of that term" and refused
to require a higher standard "merely for the sake of a bright line
[i.e., the Montreal Agreement's ten-point type requirement]."134
In conclusion, however, the concurrence made a significant
break with the majority by asserting that "the Warsaw Conven-
tion does sanction failure to provide notice of its applicability
with loss of its limit on liability."1"5 The notice provided, there-
fore, must meet a minimum standard of adequacy or be consid-
ered no notice at all.13 6
Thus, the concurrence established a belief that there was a
requirement of adequate notice within the Warsaw Convention/
Montreal Agreement system, and that the sanction for failure to
comply was the loss of the system's benefits, most notably the
limit of liability. Unfortunately, the concurrence provided little
guidance as to what should be considered as adequate notice,
except to assert that the eight-point type provided by Korean Air
Lines was adequate and that notice in four-point type would not
be deemed adequate. Thus, the Chan concurrence left a gray
area between those two points.
C. CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES, INC. V. SI-UTE
The Supreme Court later faced a sufficiency of notice ques-
tion in a slightly altered context. The notice issue in Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute 37 emerged from the insertion in the
passenger travel ticket of a forum selection clause specifying that
any "disputes and matters whatsoever arising under, in connec-
tion with or incident to this Contract shall be litigated, if at all,
in and before a Court located in the State of Florida, U.S.A., to
the exclusion of the Courts of any other state or country."138
The main question for resolution was whether or not such a
clause was enforceable.
Unfortunately, the majority's analysis of the problem does not
shed much light on the question of notice: Rather, the majority
avoided the question by stating that the "[r]espondents essen-
tially have conceded that they had notice of the forum-selection
134 Id. at 151.
135 Id. at 152.
136 Id.
137 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
138 Id. at 587-88 (quoting passenger ticket).
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provision.1 39 The Court cited the respondents' brief which
conceded that they had as much notice as "three pages of fine
print can be communicated," and further that the court of ap-
peals had evaluated the case under the assumption that the re-
spondents had notice. 40 Thereby excepting the issue of notice
from consideration, the majority held that the clause was
enforceable.
A far more relevant analysis, with regard to the issue of notice,
was undertaken in dissent by Justice Stevens, joined by Justice
Marshall. The dissent immediately took issue with the majority's
accession to the assertion that there was actual notice in the
case. Although the respondents did not take up this issue, the
dissent found it incredible that a "purchaser of a Carnival Cruise
Lines passenger ticket is fully and fairly notified about the exist-
ence of the choice of forum clause in the fine print on the back
of the ticket."1 41 The dissent further noted that only the most
meticulous of passengers was likely to become aware of the fo-
rum selection provision, due to the minuscule type size and its
placement as the eighth of twenty-five clauses.' 42 The effective-
ness of this notice was challenged even further by the fact that
one only had the opportunity to read these well-disguised provi-
sions after having purchased what was-as the passenger would
discover in paragraph 16(a)-a nonrefundable ticket. 43 Thus,
even if the passenger became aware of the clause, his or her only
means of avoiding the provision was to cancel the trip at the last
minute, without any refund.1 " This was not a choice that most
potential passengers would make, or even consider to be a viable
option, and therefore they were stuck with the provision.
The dissent then disputed other aspects of the majority's deci-
sion, but for our purposes, the argument that there could not
possibly be actual notice in the circumstances presented by the
case is very enlightening. Although not cited, the dissent's de-
scription of the type size and placement of the notice is reminis-
cent of the Lisi court's finding that the notice in that case was
"camouflaged in Lilliputian print in a thicket of 'Conditions of
Contract.' ,,145 The discussion of the actual availability of the no-
139 Id. at 590 (citing Brief for Respondents at 26).
140 Id.




145 Lisi, 370 F.2d at 514 (quoting Lisi, 253 F. Supp. at 243).
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tice allegedly provided in Carnival Cruise Lines similarly brings to
mind the situations presented in Mertens and Warren. Where in
Carnival Cruise Lines passengers only received notice after they
had purchased a non-refundable ticket, thereby presenting
them with virtually no options, the individuals in Mertens and
Warren also received their tickets, and thus their notice of the
limitations on liability, while on the plane or boarding, thereby
rendering the individuals incapable of taking any measures to
protect themselves. Interestingly, in Mertens, Warren, and Lisi,
the respective courts found that the timing of delivery was defi-
cient or that the actual notice contained on the ticket was inade-
quate and refused to hold the claimants bound by the provisions
contained in the notice. This leaves one to wonder what the
Carnival Cruise Lines result would have been if the question of
adequate notice had been addressed by the majority.
D. THE AFTERMATH OF CHAN v. KOREAN AIR LiNivs, LTD. AND
CARiVAL "CRUsE LINs, INC. V. SHUTE
In the aftermath of Chan and Carnival Cruise Lines, only one
portion of the dilemma can reasonably be said to be settled
without question-the effect of the Montreal Agreement vis-d-
vis the Warsaw Convention. It is apparent that some lower
courts' conception of the two as an integrated whole, reading
the Montreal Agreement into the Warsaw Convention, is not the
accepted method of interpretation.
The Montreal Agreement reached its apex, in terms of the
efficacy of its provisions and the judicial respect afforded it
within the Warsaw system, in In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw,
Poland on March 14, 1980.146 The Warsaw court perceived the
Montreal Agreement to be a "special contract" under the War-
saw Convention, and, as such, interpreted it as modifying the
provisions of the Convention which it addressed. 47 In this man-
ner, for example, the limit of liability was raised to $75,000, and
the ten-point type notice requirement was held to be the stan-
dard for determining the adequacy of notice. 48
This view of the Montreal Agreement quickly came under at-
tack, most notably from the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia in In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September
146 705 F.2d at 85.
147 Id. at 88.
148 Id.
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1, 1983.149 The Korean Air Lines court first disputed the Warsaw
court's linkage of the ten-point type notice requirement and the
loss of the limitation of liability, stating that no such coupling of
the provisions occurred in the Montreal Agreement itself.150
More importantly, the Korean Air Lines court disagreed with the
Warsaw court's interpretation of the Montreal Agreement as
amending the Warsaw Convention.151 The Korean Air Lines
court asserted that this method of construction was improper.
Although the Korean Air Lines court felt that the Montreal Agree-
ment must be read in connection with the Warsaw Convention,
the court contended that the Agreement could not be read en-
tirely into the Warsaw Convention. 15 2 The Korean Air Lines court
stated that "[t]he Montreal Agreement is not a negotiated
amendment to the Warsaw Convention" and, while it had some
effect, namely raising the limits of liability and waiving certain
defenses, it could not be interpreted as an amendment to the
Warsaw Convention. 153
It is worth noting that the Warsaw court's opinion on the mat-
ter of notice was neither maverick nor discredited ab initio. In re
Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, Louisiana on July 9, 198215
was being decided during approximately the same time as the
Korean Air Lines case (the accident in New Orleans occurred prior
to that in Korean Air Lines, but the final appeal in the case was
decided after the district court opinion in Korean Air Lines). The
New Orleans court, apparently cognizant of both the Warsaw and
the Korean Air Lines opinions, followed the rationale of the War-
saw court and gave efficacy to the ten-point type standard estab-
lished in the Montreal Agreement.1 5
These strongly divergent views clashed in Chan. With the no-
tice provided by Korean Air Lines printed in eight-point type,
the interpretation of the efficacy of the ten-point type notice re-
quirement in the Montreal Agreement could be crucial. Inter-
estingly, the question went almost unaddressed, as the majority
never found it necessary to deal with the Agreement, deciding
the case on other grounds.5 6 In all likelihood, however, the fi-
149 664 F. Supp. at 1463.
150 Id. at 1475.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 1476.
153 Id. at 1477.
154 789 F.2d at 1092.
155 Id. at 1098.
156 See Chan, 490 U.S. at 135.
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nal word on the conflicting interpretations was delivered in the
Chan concurrence. Reaching a different conclusion than the
majority on the initial issue, the concurrence found it necessary
to address the proper handling of the Montreal Agreement. In
particular, it was necessary to determine whether or not the ten-
point type notice requirement was the Warsaw Conference/
Montreal Agreement system's accepted standard for determin-
ing adequacy of notice. The concurrence made quick work of
the contention that the Montreal Agreement should be seen as
controlling on the issues it addresses. The concurrence stated
that "[t]he Montreal Agreement is a private agreement among
airline companies, which cannot and does not purport to
amend the Warsaw Convention." 5 7 Additionally, the concur-
rence found that "the Montreal Agreement ... [does not] pur-
port to sanction failure to provide notice according to the
Agreement's specifications with loss of the Warsaw Convention's
limits on liability. 158
Thus, it appears that, in the aftermath of Chan, the status of
the Montreal Agreement has been clarified, and in some ways,
diminished. Although only in a concurrence, the Supreme
Court has spoken directly and forcefully on how the Montreal
Agreement should be interpreted in connection with the War-
saw Convention. In light of such an assessment by the Supreme
Court, it would be very difficult to argue that a different mode
of interpreting the Montreal Agreement would be proper. The
Montreal Agreement, therefore, while having a powerful effect
on certain elements of the Warsaw Convention system, can only
be seen as a private agreement among carriers, and, as such,
cannot be grafted onto or otherwise amend the Warsaw
Convention.
It is interesting to note a certain internal inconsistency in the
Chan concurrence's handling of the Montreal Agreement. It
viewed the document as a private agreement between the airline
companies that cannot have the effect of amending the Warsaw
Convention.'59 Ostensibly, such an interpretation would extend
to all of the provisions of the Agreement. Thus, one would ex-
pect the alteration of the limit of liability to be given the same
efficacy as the requirement for the notice of that limitation to be
157 Id. at 150 (Brennan, J., concurring).
158 Id. at 150-51.
159 Id. at 150.
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printed in ten-point type. It does not appear, however, that this
would be the situation if the case were to arise.
The argument against linking the failure to provide notice in
ten-point type with the loss of the limitation of liability is two-
pronged. The initial assertion is that the Montreal Agreement,
as a private contractual agreement, cannot be allowed to amend
an international accord such as the Warsaw Convention. Thus,
it is improper to perceive the .ten-point requirement of the Mon-
treal Agreement as the definitive standard for determining the
adequacy of notice under the Warsaw Convention system, if
such adequacy is even required. The second prong of the argu-
ment is that the Montreal Agreement itself does not include any
sanction for the failure to provide ten-point notice. Therefore,
even if the Agreement were to be given binding effect on the
airlines, the contention that the carrier should.lose its limitation
on liability due to unsatisfactory notice is not supported by the
text. Thereby, the Chan concurrence, which did feel adequate
notice is required, avoided regarding the Montreal Agreement
as the expression of the standard for adequate notice, and re-
fused to couple less than ten-point type notice with a loss of the
limitation of liability. 160
The question arises, however, what if, instead of providing the
notice in less than ten-point type, a carrier refused to accept
$75,000 as the limitation of the carrier's liability, instead insist-
ing on the $8300 provided for in the Warsaw Convention (the
only international convention on the subject of which the
United States is a party)? This scenario could arise in any law-
suit brought subsequent to a crash where a party is seeking com-
pensation for the death of a passenger. Remarkably, the current
state of the law in the United States would support the carrier's
position. The Chan concurrence's assessment of the Montreal
Agreement, if followed, would provide an untenable position for
a court, being forced to choose between disregarding the rule of
law established by the Supreme Court or allowing a mere $8300
to suffice as compensation for the death of an individual's fa-
ther, mother, wife, or husband. It has been clearly stated that
the Montreal Agreement cannot be seen as amending the War-
saw Convention, so the raising of the limits of liability cannot be
read wholesale into the Warsaw Convention.
The next approach would be to look at the Montreal Agree-
ment itself, but as the Chan concurrence has already established,
160 Id. at 152.
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the Agreement does not establish the loss of the limitation of
liability as a sanction for failure to adhere to its provisions, 161
including the $75,000 limit of liability. A claimant would be left
to argue that the carriers should be held to the terms of their
agreement, a contention that has not proved effective in litiga-
tion regarding the other provisions of the Agreement. Thus,
under strict application of the current modes of interpretation
of the Montreal Agreement's position and efficacy within the
Warsaw Convention system, a carrier conceivably could avoid
the $75,000 limitation of liability and hold compensation to
$8300.
Obviously, the scenario discussed above is not likely to occur.
No court, regardless of the state of the law, would allow such a
result. Recognizing that, no carrier is likely to make such a
claim, realizing that a $75,000 limit is far preferable to no limit
at all. Were a carrier to attempt to decrease its liability further,
courts would likely find a way to avoid the harsh results of the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Convention system.
Thus, with the Convention system held inapplicable in this hy-
pothetical case, ordinary tort principles would control, and
these principles contain no limits on liability. This situation is
the reason the carriers assented to the Montreal Agreement in
the first place. However, the discussion does serve t.o highlight
an inconsistency in the way the courts are approaching the Mon-
treal Agreement. All the provisions of the Agreement should be
given the same effect. To inexplicably hold otherwise causes
confusion and decimates the intent and the impact of the
Agreement and thereby the adjustments that were to be effected
in the Warsaw Convention system.
With the issue of the interpretation of the Montreal Agree-
ment addressed, however inappropriately, what of the, remain-
ing issues raised in Chan? While the more literal method of
interpreting the Warsaw Convention text initially carried the
day,162 the issue was too closely decided and too hotly disputed
to lead one to believe that it will not be revisited. The mode of
interpretation was decided by only the slimmest of margins, 5-4
(the justices were unanimous that Korean Air Lines was entitled
to the limitation of liability, but the question of the existence of
an adequate notice requirement for a carrier availing itself of
that limitation was the subject of the concurrence's dispute with
161 Id. at 150-51.
162 Id. at 134-35.
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the majority),16 and there have been many changes to the
Court since that decision.
These changes, on their surface, appear to weigh in favor of
maintaining the majority. A larger percentage of the concur-
rence has left the Court since the time of the Chan decision, and
at least one of the replacements, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
can be expected to share the majority's view of the issue. It was
Justice Ginsburg who wrote the court of appeals' affirmance of
Korean Air Lines' 14 before the case was decided by.the Supreme
Court under the title Chan.165 The majority in Chan agreed with
the district court and Justice Ginsburg's affirmance.166 There is
no reason to think' that any of their views have changed since
that time.
It was hoped that Carnival Cruise Lines1 67 would provide an in-
dication of how the battle was developing, but, at least in the
notice arena, it was a disappointment. By skirting the available,
although not squarely presented, issue of the sufficiency of no-
tice in the case, the Supreme Court missed a marvelous opportu-
nity to elucidate a definitive statement on the issue. However,
what is unsaid is sometimes as significant as what is said, and
that may turn out to be the case with Carnival Cruise Lines.
Initially, it is significant that the Carnival Cruise Lines majority
went to great lengths to ensure that readers of the opinion
would know that the issue of the sufficiency of Carnival Cruise
Lines' burying of the notice in small print, in the eighth of
twenty-five paragraphs and on a nonrefundable ticket, was not a
part of its consideration of the case.1 68 This certainly raises the
possibility that, had the adequacy of the notice been at issue, the
Court would have decided the case differently. Such an exten-
sive disavowal of consideration of the sufficiency of the notice
issue can be interpreted as the Court's discomfort with the no-
tice provided and the Court's desire not to be in any way per-
ceived as holding that the notice was acceptable. This unusual
vehemence in declaring something a nonissue and implying a
lack of approval indicates that, had the issue of notice been con-
sidered, it may very well have been held to be insufficient. Addi-
tionally, such a statement effectively precludes any attempt at
163 Id. at 152 (Brennan, J., concurring).
164 829 F.2d at 1171.
165 490 U.S. at 122.
166 Id. at 135.
167 499 U.S. at 585.
168 See id. at 590.
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citing Carnival Cruise Lines for the proposition that either ade-
quate notice is not required or that provision of notice in the
manner accomplished by Carnival Cruise Lines is sufficient.
The strength of the dissenting opinion's objection to the form
of notice provided by Carnival Cruise Lines is noteworthy. The
notice issue was not addressed in any significant way by the ma-
jority and had been conceded by the petitioners, but the dissent-
ers still raised the issue. It is clear from the dissenters' opinion
that they would have disregarded the petitioners' concession
and dealt with the gross insufficiency of the notice provided.
The inadequacies of the notice described and the conclusion
that such a notice system left the passenger with very few op-
tions, none of them particularly attractive, is reminiscent of the
conclusions drawn by many of the courts addressing the notice
issue in the context of the Warsaw Convention system.1 69 As
such, the dissent in Carnival Cruise Lines will, in all likelihood,
have a greater impact on the issue in the future than the major-
ity opinion.
In conclusion, Carnival Cruise Lines'will turn out to be a mi-
rage in terms of importance in the area of adequate notice in
contracts for passage. Its apparently strict holding of enforcing
the provisions of adhesion contracts should be easily distin-
guished in the future based on the Court's prominent disavowal
of consideration of the notice issue. The majority opinion thus
being removed from having precedential effect, the only ele-
ment of the case remaining on the issue is the dissent. Although
one could argue that the dissent is strongly on the side of requir-
ing some form of adequate notice before enforcing the provi-
sions of such contracts, it remains only a dissent, not possessing
the precedential effect of a majority opinion.
Thus, with little illumination from Carnival Cruise Lines, and
the uncertain effects of the changes in the composition of the
Supreme Court, one is left a bit in the dark about the future
effects of the Chan holding. The legacy of Chan is uncertainty.
At this point in time, the law of the land in the United States is
that there is no linkage between adequacy of notice of the limi-
fation of liability provided by the Warsaw Convention system
and the availability of that limit to the carrier. The Supreme
Court held in Chan that the plain meaning of Article 3(2) of the
Warsaw Convention provided the sanction of removing the limit
169 Id.
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of liability only for the failure of the carrier to deliver a ticket.17 °
Failure to provide adequate notice of such limitations was con-
sidered an "irregularity" in the ticket, not removing the contract
for transportation from the provisions of the Convention
system. 17
1
While the majority in Chan was clear in what it held, what is
unclear is how long that position will be able to remain the ma-
jority position. The opinion was met by a forceful and persua-
sive concurrence. The primary assertion of that concurrence
was that it was the drafters' clear intention that the two concepts
of notice and availability of the liability limitation be coupled
and thus, inadequate notice should result in the loss of the, limi-
tation. 72 This concurrence, combined with the changes in the
composition of the Supreme Court and the dissent in Carnival
Cruise Lines (advocating an evaluation of the adequacy of the
notice of a provision, even where notice was conceded), indicate
that the issue of the Warsaw Convention sanction for failure to
provide adequate notice of the liability limitation may well one
day be revisited and could result in a different outcome.
V. THE NEXT CASE-WHAT RESULT SHOULD THE
COURT REACH?
The next claim that a carrier's provision of inadequate notice
of the limits of liability in the Warsaw Convention should result
in the loss of those limitations would have to arise out of a situa-
tion wherein the notice provided by the carrier is, at the very
least, printed in less than eight-point type. In all likelihood, the
type will be either significantly smaller than that or have some
type of structural obfuscation in combination with the small type
size. This is so because of the Chan concurrence on which any
future claimants must base their argument. While not defining
a set or bright line standard for the size and structural situation
required for a notice to be deemed adequate, the concurrence
stated that the eight-point type size of the notice presented in
the case was surely adequate, but further commented that four-
point type size could not be so considered.173 Thus, the notice"
170 Id. at 135.
171 Id. at 128.
172 Id. at 152 (Brennan,J., concurring).
173 Id. at 150, 152.
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in question in the future scenario must be less than eight-point
type size.'" 4
The debate will inevitably focus on Chan, the controlling case
in the area and one in which the majority and concurring opin-
ions crystalize virtually all of the strongest arguments for each
position. The carrier will certainly argue that Chan should be
followed, that the Warsaw Convention text is plain on its face,
and that its provisions should be .given effect as written. The
passengers will side with the concurrence, asserting that the text
has some ambiguities, and that the drafting history should be
studied and followed to effectuate the intent of its drafters.
When re-analyzing the arguments and the text, the material
should be "considered without the self-affixed blindfold that
prevents the [c]ourt from examining anything beyond the treaty
language itself" 175 as the concurrence asserted the majority had
done in Chan, because, as the following discussion will attempt
to illustrate, the majority view in Chan is not the stronger view
and should not prevail again.
The divergence between the two arguments begins at the
most fundamental level, the method of interpretation of the
text. The well-known tenet of statutory and treaty construction
that, where clear, the words of the text are to be followed closely
has been employed to justify an exceptionally literal reading and
interpretation of the text of the Warsaw Convention. 176 What
has been overlooked are the words "where clear" which become
vital when considering the real meaning of the tenet. Such lan-
guage allows for, and even encourages, a nonliteral interpreta-
tion where the words of the text lend themselves to more than
one interpretation. As even Justice Scalia stated in Chan, when
referring to the drafting history of the Warsaw Convention,
"[such material] may be consulted to elucidate a text that is am-
biguous."1 77 It is the contention of Justice Scalia and the rest of
the majority that the Warsaw Convention text is free from ambi-
174 It is questionable whether, in light of Chan, any of the international air
carriers will print a notice in less than eight-point type. However, when the Mon-
treal Agreement was adopted, no one could have expected any of the participat-
ing air carriers to print their notices in less than ten-point type (as did LOT, KAL
and even Pan Am).
175 Id. at 136 (Brennan, J., concurring).
176 Id. at 134.
177 Id.
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guity. However, such an interpretation ignores other, similarly
well-known and vital, tenets of construction and the text itself.178
The Chan majority's approach to the text was too restrictive in
two ways. First, the measure used to determine if ambiguity ex-
isted was far too narrow. "When interpreting a treaty,... 'begin
with the text of the treaty and the context in which the written
words are used.' ",179 The focus of the analysis of the text to de-
termine ambiguity should be the whole of the Warsaw Conven-
tion text, not just certain articles or portions thereof. An
analysis of the complete text reveals enough asymmetries and
incongruities to allow a determination of ambiguity. The most
notable of these are the phrase "absence, irregularity, or loss of
the passenger ticket" 80 and the inexplicably divergent ways that
sanctions for noncompliance are handled in the three sections
of the Warsaw Convention. Justice Scalia's almost smug refer-
ence to Webster's Second International Dictionary in Chan in
which the definition of "irregularity" is quoted does nothing to
alleviate the ambiguity of the Article and, in fact, reinforces the
notion that the textual interpretation is not being performed in
the proper context.18 The question is not what the definition
of "irregularity" is, but rather to what it refers and how that af-
fects the functioning of the Convention. If one accepts the liter-
alist interpretation, then the absence of, or any irregularity in,
the Article's required inclusions on the ticket has no effect. The
question, and hence the ambiguity, remains, if any form of com-
pliance with any portion or all of the provisions is completely
irrelevant, then why did the drafters of the Warsaw Convention
make them requirements?
178 It is interesting to note that when confronted with a similar treaty interpre-
tation situation in O'Connor v. United States, 479 U.S. 27 (1986),Justice Scalia's
method of interpretation is the exact opposite of the method employed in Chan.
Where in Chan he will not go beyond the text, in O'Connor he ignores what ap-
pears to be an unambiguous text and employs methods of interpretation he finds
to be improper in Chan. Using procedural history, a determination of the effects
of the treaty under the two disparate interpretations, and courses of conduct as
indicators, Justice Scalia, in O'Connor, provides the treaty with a meaning that
clearly contradicts the one suggested by its plain language.
179 Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699-700
(1988) (citing Soci&6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. United States Dist.
Court, 482 U.S. 522, 534 (1987)) (quoting Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397
(1985)).
180 Chan, 490 U.S. at 127 (quoting Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(2),
49 Stat. at 3015).
181 Id. at 128.
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Similarly, a contextual consideration of the differences in the
sanction structures for the three sections of the Convention
leads to a certain level of bewilderment. The sanction of the
loss of the limitation of liability applies where there are deficien-
cies in the baggage check and in the air waybill but not, accord-
ing to the literal interpretation of the text, for deficiencies in
the passenger ticket. Such a system puts a higher value on pro-
viding notice regarding the limits to damage to goods than on
human life. Asymmetrical treatment, in an otherwise symmetri-
cal treaty, that creates such a bizarre result should be considered
an ambiguity and warrant further investigation. "Other general
rules of construction may be brought to bear on difficult or am-
biguous passages. "11
The second way in which the interpretation was too restrictive
was that it failed to take into consideration the type of docu-
ment that was being analyzed. The Warsaw Convention is a
treaty, and "treaties are construed more liberally than private
agreements, and to ascertain their meaning we may look beyond
the written words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations,
and the practical construction adopted by the parties."1 83 Tradi-
tionally, the "words [of treaties] are to be taken liberally in the
light of evident purposes" and "[w]hen two constructions of a
treaty are admissible, one restrictive of the rights that may be
claimed under it and the other liberal, the latter is always to be
preferred."1 84 Such canons of construction were clearly not ap-
plied to the analysis of the Warsaw Convention undertaken by
the Chan majority. The majority is quite straightforward about
its restrictive approach and refusal to even attempt to go beyond
the text and determine the intent of the parties and goals of the
treaty, as these canons of construction seem to require.
Viewing the provisions of the Warsaw Convention in the
proper context reveals at least a certain level of ambiguity.
Thus, it is proper to use alternative means of interpretation, in-
cluding drafting history. The drafting history provides a wealth
of information about the intent of the drafters regarding the
provisions of the Warsaw Convention. Although complete reli-
ance on drafting history for the meaning of a text is a dangerous
proposition, especially when apparently contradictory to the
182 Volkswagenwerk, 486 U.S. at 700.
183 Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. at 396 (quoting Choctaw Nation of Indians v.
United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943)).
184 In re Zalewski's Estate, 55 N.E.2d 184, 186 (N.Y. 1944) (citations omitted).
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text, where the text allows for multiple interpretations, such in-
sight into the intended meaning of the provision can be enor-
mously beneficial. The Warsaw Convention presents just such a
situation with regard to determining what sanction is available
for deficiencies in the carrier's statement of notice.
The drafting history is remarkably clear, at points, regarding
the system of sanctions that was contemplated. The Convention
was begun simply to deal with air waybills, but was later ex-
panded to deal with passenger travel. The history indicates that
the requirements and sanction for failure to comply with such
requirements for the air waybill were appropriated to similarly
deal with passenger travel. Thus, just as the air waybill, the pas-
senger ticket was to include the agreed-upon particulars (ad-
dress of carrier, etc.) along with a statement providing the
consumer notice that the service is subject to the limitations of
liability found in the Convention. The sanction for failure to
meet all of these requirements was intended to be a removal of
the entitlement to the Convention's limitations of liability pro-
vided the carrier."' 5 The intended symmetry of the approach to
the system's regulation of air waybill, baggage check, and pas-
senger travel was also reflected in the account of the discussions
by the reporter for the Second Committee, Henry de Vos: "The
sanction for transporting passengers without regular tickets is
the same as that for the transportation of baggage and of
goods." '186 In a later report, one accompanying the final draft of
the Convention, Henry de Vos reiterated the intended symme-
try, this time using language that indicated that the word "regu-
lar" in the previous report was to mean "a ticket conforming to
the Convention.""8 7 Thus, it appears quite clear that a deficient
passenger ticket was to be given the exact same treatment as a
deficient baggage check or air waybill. It is interesting to note
that those arguing against linking inadequate notice with the
loss of the liability limitation have seized upon the differences
between the language used in the passenger, air waybill, and
baggage check sections as an indication that different treatment
was intended, when the drafting history of the Convention indi-
cates that the exact opposite is true.
By the time the draft was finally voted on at Warsaw, there had
been many amendments and additions to the language of the
185 Chan, 490 U.S. at 140 (Brennan, J., concurring).
186 Id. (quoting de Vos report at 73a, 92a).
187 Id. at 140-41.
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Convention. None, however, was accompanied by any express
intent to alter the fundamental symmetry of the requirement
and sanction regime developed in the original draft. In fact,
one amendment, offered by the Japanese delegation and ac-
cepted with no discussion, attempted to remove any doubt that
the failure to comply with the notice clause would result in the
loss of the limits of liability. This was done by reworking the text
to make the notice requirement a lettered particular, rather
than maintain its position in a free-standing paragraph. Unfor-
tunately, subsequent amendments, not having any express in-
tent to do so, had the effect of reinjecting the ambiguity into the
textual provisions."'
The clarity of the original draft's position regarding the sanc-
tion for failure to provide adequate notice of the limitation on
the passenger ticket, combined with the frequently stated inten-
tion to keep the sanctions the same for all the sections of the
Convention, is evidence of a strong conviction that those sanc-
tions should apply in the area of passenger travel. The fact that
more ambiguity cropped up in the construction of the Article,
with no expression whatsoever of an intent to affect this impor-
tant principle, indicates that the development of such ambiguity
was unintentional. Thus, the intent of the drafters should be
carried out by enforcing the sanction of loss of the limitation of
liability for failure to include notice of those limits on the pas-
senger ticket.
Additionally, such a reading comports well with the canons of
construction developed regarding' treaty interpretation. As the
court in In re Zalewski's Estate directs, "words are to be taken lib-
erally in the light of evident purposes." 189 It is undeniable that,
where a statute or a treaty contains ambiguity, as the Warsaw
Convention when taken in context does, it is proper to go be-
yond the text in order to elucidate the meaning of the docu-
ment. The text clearly admits a reading that requires notice of
the limitation of liability to be provided in the passenger ticket
in order for the carriers to avail themselves of those limitations
and, as an analysis of the drafting history of the Warsaw Conven-
tion reveals, this was surely the drafters' intent. "When two con-
structions of a treaty are admissible, one restrictive of the rights
that may be claimed under it and the other liberal, the latter is
188 Id. at 143-45.
189 Zalewski's Estate, 55 N.E,2d at 186 (citing Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S.
483 (1879)).
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always to be preferred."19 ° In this instance, the interpretation
supported by the drafting history is at least as viable as the other,
if not more so, and is clearly more liberal in the granting of
rights under the treaty. Thus, following the canons of treaty
construction, it should be accepted as the proper interpretation.
To paraphrase Justice Cardozo in In re Rouss, while conse-
quences cannot alter statutes, consequences may help to fix stat-
utes' meaning.1 91 Thus, it is important to analyze the effects of
the conflicting modes of interpretation, both on the functioning
of the Warsaw Convention and on the passengers and carriers
impacted by its provisions. The restrictive interpretation would
impose the sanction of loss of liability on the carrier only for the
failure to deliver a ticket. The consequence of this in terms of
the operation of the convention is that all the items required to
be on the ticket by Article 3 would, in practice, become virtually
irrelevant. In Chan, the majority noted that in order for a docu-
ment to fail to be considered a ticket, the inadequacies would
have to be so extreme that it would be equivalent to delivering a
blank document. 92 Such a result is clearly nonsensical and fails
to provide the Convention with its intended meaning. Similarly,
the result of such an interpretation is that the carriers are able
to avoid their obligations under the Convention yet retain the
benefits. In contrast, the passengers are burdened with a limit
on damages of which they were completely unaware and thus
unable to take any measures to protect themselves. This is
clearly an inequitable result.
The consequences of a more liberal interpretation of the War-
saw Convention text, is that the provisions of Article 3 are given
the efficacy for which they were originally intended. No one
would develop a system of requirements unless they were to be
complied with. Linking the notice requirement with the limita-
tion of liability also creates a more equitable balance between
the carrier and the passenger. As part of the exchange for the
limitation of liability, the carrier would be charged with notify-
ing the passenger, who is then free to act as he or she sees fit.
For all of the above stated reasons, the Warsaw Convention
should be interpreted as removing the carrier's limitation of lia-
bility as the sanction for failure to comply with the notice re-
quirement of Article 3.
190 Id.
191 In re Rouss, 116 N.E. 782, 785 (N.Y. 1917), cet. denied, 246 U.S. 661 (1918).
192 Chan, 490 U.S. at 128-29.
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Such an interpretation still leaves a very important question
unanswered. As Justice Brennan stated in the concurrence to
Chan, "[i]f notice is... required, it must surely meet some mini-
mum standard of 'adequacy.' "193 Thus, clearly, the require-
ment of notice in the Warsaw Convention impliedly requires an
adequate or sufficient notice in order for the provision to be
satisfied.
The more difficult question is what must be provided in order
for the notice to be considered adequate. The Chan concur-
rence left a window of doubt in its analysis of adequacy. It ini-
tially asserted that the ten-point type standard established in the
Montreal Agreement could not be seen as providing the opera-
ble standard. 9 4 The analysis then turned to a consideration of
the eight-point type notice provided in the case presented,
which was deemed adequate, and the example of 4 1/2-point
type which was found inadequate. Thus, the concurrence
avoided a bright-line standard that all carriers operating in the
United States had agreed upon and provided precious little gui-
dance as to what should be considered the standard in its
stead.1 95
The ten-point type requirement in the Montreal Agreement
should be considered the standard for determining the ade-
quacy of notice under the Warsaw Convention/Montreal Agree-
ment system. Its two biggest advantages are obvious. First, the
Agreement provides for a bright-line determination of adequacy
which will lead to certainty and uniformity within the system.
Second, the ten-point standard was agreed to by the very carriers
who are to be expected to adhere to it. Thus, aside from serving
a necessary function within the system, the Agreement also has
the benefit of being, at least to some extent, consensual. The
Chan concurrence's dismissal of the Agreement was improper
and reveals internal inconsistencies in the reasoning of the opin-
ion on two separate levels. First, as previously discussed, other
provisions of the Montreal Agreement are not likely to receive
the same treatment as did the notice provisions, even though
the entire agreement operates under the same enforcement
structure, or, rather, lack thereof. There is no rational explana-
tion for this inconsistent approach. Second, the concurrence
bases much of its analysis on the concept of enforcing the intent
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of the drafters of the Warsaw Convention. To then completely
disregard the clear intent and purpose of the Montreal Agree-
ment is inexplicably inconsistent.
The Montreal Agreement was developed as an attempt to ad-
dress some of the United States' concerns about the Warsaw
Convention system in an attempt to avoid the United States de-
nouncing the Convention. 196 Primary amongst these concerns
were the limits of liability and the problem of notice to its citi-
zens regarding those limits. An agreement was reached by the
carriers operating in the United States that addressed these is-
sues by raising the limit of liability and providing a precisely
worded notice in ten-point type on every ticket for transporta-
tion involving the United States.1 97 The Agreement was clearly
meant to work in conjunction with the Warsaw Convention.
The Agreement's whole existence was an effort to keep the
United States in the system, and it is therefore reasonable to
assume that the sanctions available under the Warsaw Conven-
tion would be available to enforce the Montreal Agreement.
This view is supported by the fact that the Montreal Agreement
did not provide for its own system of enforcement procedures or
sanctions. It is hardly conceivable that an agreement of that
magnitude would be created without its drafters envisioning a
way for its provisions to be enforced. This is especially true
when one considers the position of the United States, which
surely would not remain in a treaty system it was about to de-
nounce unless the concessions received were backed with a
manner by which they Could be enforced. Additionally, much
has been made of the fact that the Montreal Agreement is a pri-
vate agreement and not a treaty, but as such, the intent of the
parties to that Agreement should be a relevant inquiry when de-
termining the meaning of the Agreement. The exchange em-
bodied in the Agreement, and thus the party's intent, was that
the carriers would be allowed to maintain limits on their liabil-
ity in return for raising liability limits and the provision of notice
of that limitation through a specifically worded statement in ten-
point type on the ticket for transportation.1 9 The ten-point
type requirement contained in the Montreal Agreement, there-
196 LOWENFELD, supra note 2, at 7-138.
197 Id. at 7-144.
198 Those who negotiated the Montreal Agreement must have intended that
the requirement of ten-point notice would not only be followed but would assure
that a Lisi situation would not occur again. It is fair to say, therefore, that if they
had considered circumstances where either the notice was not given at all or not
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fore, should be recognized as the standard for determining the
adequacy of notice of the limitation of liability provided for in
the Warsaw Convention/Montreal Agreement system.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although lending itself to differing textual interpretations,
the drafting history clearly indicates that it was the intent of the
drafters of the Warsaw Convention to remove the limitation of
the carrier's liability established in the Convention as a sanction
for failure to provide notice of that limitation in the passenger
ticket. As with any other form of required notice, this notice of
the limitation must comply with some form of minimal standard
of adequacy. That standard was established in the Montreal
Agreement which required the notice to be printed in ten-point
type. Thus, the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Agree-
ment present an integrated system whereby the carrier receives
a limit on its liability in return for liability without fault and the
provision of an adequately sized (i.e., ten-point type) notice to
passengers that those limits exist, thereby enabling passengers to
protect themselves as they see fit. The only element missing
from this well thought-out and executed quid pro quo is judicial
enforcement of its terms, which, ironically, was likely believed to
be unnecessary as the agreement was probably intended to be
self-executing.
given in accordance with the ten-point type requirement, they would not have
wished the limits to apply.
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